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Article
Does the Internet contribute to the public sphere? This seem-
ingly simple question has been notoriously difficult to answer 
for the better part of the past two decades. Almost since the 
advent of the Internet, there has been great interest in analyz-
ing and understanding online communication from the per-
spective of public sphere theory (e.g. Dahlberg, 1998; Keane, 
1995; Sunstein, 1995).
It is hardly surprising that the Internet has been garnering 
attention from public sphere scholars for a long time. The 
Internet as a network of networks has some inherent technical 
properties, such as interactivity, openness, and the potential 
for equality, that lend themselves to reflections from a public 
sphere perspective. In order to analyze the Internet in such a 
manner, online communication is often contrasted to classical 
mass media, because the latter offer, for the most part, only a 
one-way stream of information flow, whereas the Internet 
holds the potential for many-to-many communication without 
some of the limitations of physical many-to-many communi-
cation, such as the need to convene in one geographical loca-
tion (Calhoun, 1998). In this line of reasoning, the Internet 
evoked images of a possible digital agora early on (Rheingold, 
1993b). In recent years, the interactivity of the Internet is per-
haps most prominently on display with social media (boyd & 
Ellison, 2007): if by social media we mean Internet-based 
applications that allow the creation and exchange of User 
Generated Content (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010), then social 
media represent the most acute and a very immediate form of 
an interaction between users who are not merely a passive 
audience, but active and interconnected agents.
The question of whether these properties of the Internet 
actually contribute to the public sphere, that is, whether the 
potentials of the Internet are actually realized, is the matter 
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of ongoing and somewhat heated scientific debate (for an 
overview, see Schäfer, 2015). Some authors maintain an 
optimistic position. They see the change the Internet brings 
about as significant (e.g. Shirky, 2011) and expect it to 
give rise to new waves of democratization (e.g. Bohman, 
2004; Lagos, Coopman, & Tomhave, 2014; Langman, 2005) 
because the Internet represents a highly fertile soil for public 
communication among citizens. Other authors are more cau-
tious in their conclusions. They argue that an impact of 
online communication on the public sphere is to be expected, 
but they see the impact as a limited one (Dahlgren, 2005; 
Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010; Papacharissi, 2002). Others still 
dismiss the notion of the Internet as a contribution to the pub-
lic sphere and warn of a threat to democratic processes by 
mistaking online communication as a functionally and struc-
turally equal counterpart to a more conventional understand-
ing of the public sphere (e.g. Dean, 2003; West, 2013).
How does this ambiguity with regard to the Internet’s rel-
evance for the public sphere come about? On their own, 
many findings have high degrees of plausibility and validity. 
But synthesizing all of the fragmented pieces of theoretical 
and empirical research into a coherent big picture is a daunt-
ing task. Not only is there a great amount of research, but the 
research also relies on differing notions of the concept of the 
public sphere. The public sphere is not a clear-cut theoretical 
concept and there can be, we believe, rational disagreements 
over its definition. In order to assess the relevance of the 
Internet for the public sphere, it is necessary to take this dif-
fuse theoretical nature of the public sphere into account and 
offer a very explicit theoretical and empirical understanding. 
We aim to do so with this article.
The first step is the introduction of a less rigid understand-
ing of the public sphere. We propose a theoretical model of 
generalized functions of the public sphere. Instead of being 
fixated on what the public sphere ought to do, it is more fruit-
ful to think about the degree to which the empirical functions 
of the public sphere are realized. Such a functional, outcome-
oriented perspective lends itself to a generalization: to which 
degree these functions are met is not a question that can only 
be asked in Western democracies. In a second step, we per-
form an exploratory data analysis based on certain structural 
preconditions in order to assess the potential impact of the 
Internet on the public sphere. In a comparison of over 160 
countries, we examine whether there is a plausible corre-
spondence between our theoretical functions of the public 
sphere and the empirical structural preconditions for the pos-
sible realization of the public sphere in these countries. Our 
approach strikes a balance between theoretical argumenta-
tion and empirical analysis in order to provide a theoretico-
empirical framework for further case-study-based research.
The Contested Concept of the Public 
Sphere
The concept of the public sphere is one that is widely recog-
nized and intuitively palpable, but rather difficult to clearly 
define and operationalize in empirical terms. While there is 
little disagreement over the idea of a public sphere in and of 
itself, the specific meaning of that concept is contested. The 
nature of this disagreement is not simply one of different 
authors meaning completely different things when talking 
about the “public sphere.” Rather, the contestation over the 
concept of the public sphere arises precisely because there is 
usually a baseline agreement over its meaning, and given 
that baseline agreement, disagreements over the concept’s 
normative valence as well as its necessary and sufficient 
dimensions arise. The public sphere thus displays the typical 
properties of an essentially contested concept (Collier, 
Hidalgo, & Maciuceanu, 2006; Gallie, 1955). What makes 
the public sphere an essentially contested concept is the real-
ization that the conceptual disagreements over the public 
sphere, deep though they are, can be rational in nature: if 
informed and coherent enough arguments are presented, con-
ceptualizations of the public sphere can reasonably differ 
from each other without any of them being necessarily more 
correct than the others.
The contested state of public sphere conceptualizations 
arises primarily from the fact that the public sphere is not a 
phenomenon that can be clearly observed and measured. 
Dewey (1927) described the public sphere as “The lasting, 
extensive and serious consequences of associated activity . . 
.” and remarked that “In itself it is unorganized and formless” 
(p. 67). The formless nature of the public sphere led Lippmann 
(1925) to describe the public sphere as a “phantom” that 
“does not select the candidate, write the platform, outline the 
policy any more than it builds the automobile or acts the play” 
(p. 57). These two early conceptualizations by Dewey and 
Lippmann already demonstrate the nature of the public sphere 
as an essentially contested concept. Even though the differ-
ences in the conceptualizations between Dewey and Lippmann 
are sometimes portrayed as fundamental, they did actually 
have a shared baseline agreement (Schudson, 2008), but dif-
fering views on the capacity of the public sphere to sustain the 
functioning of a democratic republic.
An overview of more contemporary strands differing but 
rational concepts for the public sphere is presented by Ferree, 
Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht (2002a). The authors are 
interested in what qualities a public sphere should have in 
order to “nurture and sustain a vigorous democratic public 
life” (p. 289). The four models the authors identify (repre-
sentative liberal, participatory liberal, discursive, and con-
structionist) differ on the input, throughput, and output 
dimensions and originate from different traditions of norma-
tive thought. In part, those different traditions of normative 
thought are due to the country- or region-specific political 
realities, such as the differences between corporatist and plu-
ralist interest-group participation (cf. Schmitter, 1974 for an 
elaboration on corporatism and pluralism).
The magnitude of disagreements between different con-
ceptualizations of the public sphere can be greater still. For 
example, some authors maintain that the public sphere 
should not serve any normative ends nor be based on any 
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normative premises. One of the more prominent proponents 
of such a non-normative public sphere is Luhmann (2000). 
By embedding the concept of the public sphere in his sys-
tems theory approach, Luhmann strips the public sphere of 
any rationality pretensions and understands it from a purely 
descriptive-functional angle.
Faced with such a multitude of conceptual understand-
ings, one might get the impression of the public sphere as an 
“anything goes” approach. However, as mentioned before, 
the public sphere as an essentially contested concept means 
that different conceptualizations are not arbitrary, but instead 
have a shared baseline around which different understand-
ings are built. We operate in this very fashion with the model 
that we introduce: our starting point is a common baseline 
understanding of the public sphere, to which we add further 
aspects. Moreover, these additional aspects in our proposed 
model are not new but derived from well-established theo-
retical and empirical findings. The innovation in our model is 
the manner in which we collate these different aspects into 
one concept.
A Model of Generalized Functions of 
the Public Sphere
In this section, we introduce a model of generalized func-
tions of the public sphere. The functions in our model are 
summarized in Table 1, along with their requirements, pos-
sible effects, and the magnitude of impact that the Internet 
can have for the realization of these functions. These aspects 
are discussed in the following subsections.
Three Properties: Functionalism, Generalization, 
and Hierarchical Order
The baseline understanding which serves as our theoreti-
cal starting point is the public sphere as a network of 
communication:
The public sphere can best be described as a network for 
communicating information and points of view (i.e., opinions 
expressing affirmative or negative attitudes); the streams of 
communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesized in 
such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified 
public opinions. (Habermas, 1996, p. 360)
This definition incorporates several important aspects. 
First, we are interested in communication and thus we do not 
conceptualize the public sphere as a geographical, but a com-
municative space. Second, the public sphere is not simply the 
sum of existing atomistic communication, but can be con-
ceptualized as a network. Third, when bundled into public 
opinions, streams of public communication can have impact.
Habermas is one of the most well-known proponents of a 
normative conceptualization of the public sphere. Even though 
we use his baseline definition as a starting point, we do not 
embrace his normative elaborations. We do not operate with a 
priori beliefs on what the public sphere should do, but we pro-
pose instead to focus on what the public sphere actually does. 
Thus, the first property of our proposed model is a functional-
ist one. A functionalist perspective, of course, is not new. For 
example, the aforementioned perspective of Luhmann (2000) 
is functional in nature. A functionalist perspective is also pro-
posed by Dewey (1927), who builds his analysis on the prem-
ise that a researcher should focus on describing what the public 
sphere is and not what it ought to be.1
The second property of our proposed model is generaliza-
tion. The generalized functions that are identified in the fol-
lowing subsections are universal: those functions apply to 
any polity, not just Western liberal democracies.
The third property of our model is the hierarchical order 
of the functions. The four functions have a quasi-Maslowian 
(Maslow, 1943) functional ordering in that higher functions 
are likely to be realized more often when the lower functions 
show a greater degree of saturation. The higher functions 
always incorporate all the lower functions and add a new 
functional layer on top. This does not mean that in reality, 
instances of higher functions can only happen when lower 
functions are permanently met. However, a higher function 
will only exhibit permanence when the lower functions do so 
as well.
First Function: Identity Building
Engendering a sense of collective identity among a group of 
people is the first and most basic function of the public sphere. 
We refer to this function as identity building, a concept popu-
larized by Weber (1922/1978) with his Vergemeinschaftung.2 
He understood it as the “subjective feeling of the parties . . . 
that they belong together” (Weber, 1922/1978, p. 40).
The idea that societal integration through collective 
identity building is the first step to creating any sort of body 
politic is an old one. It is traceable at least to Aristotle, who 
argued that individuals’ teleological purpose was to be a 
citizen of the polis. Contractualist theories of political 
Table 1. Summary of the Hierarchical Model of Generalized Functions of the Public Sphere.
Hierarchy level Function Requirement Possible effect Impact of the Internet
Level 4 Deliberation Access and participation Rational consensus Low
Level 3 Control and criticism Freedom of speech Policy cycle Medium
Level 2 Agenda-setting Critical mass of people Receptivity High
Level 1 Identity building Access to communication Collective identity Medium
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legitimacy, beginning with Hobbes (1651/1998) and Locke 
(1689/1988) in the 17th century up to Rawls (1971) in the 
20th century, refer to a (contrafactual) moment in which 
individual people recognize each other as equals and decide 
to form a collective. The philosophical ideal of collective 
identity was perhaps most vigorously expressed by Rousseau 
(1762/2001), who described the transformation of individu-
als into citizens by partaking in the general will.
From a less philosophical and more sociological and psy-
chological point of view, there is a general consensus that 
collective identity is socially constructed (Eisenstadt & 
Giesen, 1995; Tajfel, 2010) and that communication plays a 
vital role in creating any collective identity (Hardy, Lawrence, 
& Grant, 2005; Hogg & Reid, 2006).
Identity building is not normatively loaded; whether col-
lective identity is desirable or not is a matter of case-by-case 
interpretation. It is, however, clear that any collective iden-
tity always has a demarcating aspect: the group one feels to 
belong to is in part defined by not being part of another 
group. Thus, where there is collective identity, there is inter-
group bias (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; 
Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992) with its possible conse-
quences, such as nationalistic fervor or religious radicaliza-
tion. Collective identity is both a necessity for and potential 
threat to democracies.
Impact of the Internet. In the early days of the Internet, Rhe-
ingold (1993a) noted that online communities “might be 
something entirely new in the realm of social contracts, but . 
. . they are in part a response to the hunger for community 
that has followed the disintegration of traditional communi-
ties around the world” (p. 62). Papacharissi (2002) and Dahl-
gren (2005) also emphasize identity building in the online 
environment. On this level, the public sphere is highly frag-
mented and far from ideal, but it might help people to “culti-
vate a collective identity” (Dahlgren, 2005, p. 152). The 
identity building function of the Internet is especially rele-
vant in authoritarian countries. For example, Yang (2003) 
stresses identity building as a main function of a virtual pub-
lic sphere in the Chinese context.
Clearly, then, the Internet has a potential impact on iden-
tity building. However, that impact will be of medium mag-
nitude, because it is very much dependent on the availability 
of the Internet. If only a small fraction of the people has 
access to the Internet and engages in online communication, 
a collective identity, logically, does not form.
Second Function: Agenda-Setting
When the first function of identity building reaches some 
level of permanence in the form of a collective identity, it 
becomes likelier that the political elites will become recep-
tive to public communication: agenda-setting takes place.
The term “agenda-setting” can refer to different pro-
cesses. In communication science, agenda-setting is usually 
understood in the tradition of McCombs and Shaw (1972). 
From this perspective, the aim is to find out how the mass 
media agenda impacts the issue salience of ordinary people 
as well as of the political system. In political science, agenda-
setting is understood in a more abstract way. The political 
elites as political institutions are a system that receives stim-
uli from their surroundings, and these stimuli can elicit 
responses if they pass a certain threshold (Jones & 
Baumgartner, 2005). Our understanding of agenda-setting is 
a combination of these two perspectives: public communica-
tion is the stimulus that the political elites receive, and given 
a relatively high level of identity building, the stimulus can 
be significant enough for the elites to be receptive to it.
Agenda-setting as a stimulus–response exchange between 
the public and the political elites does not necessarily per-
tain to democracy. From the perspective of the extant politi-
cal powers, engaging in this form of agenda-setting can be 
no more than self-interest with the goal of conservation of 
power.
Impact of the Internet. Research indicating that the Internet 
can play an important role for the agenda-setting function in 
less democratic countries is beginning to accumulate. A 
prominent example is China, where it has been observed that 
online communication can disrupt classical flows of agenda-
setting. State-sponsored media traditionally had the role of 
setting the government agenda onto the public, but online 
communication is beginning to reverse the effect in some 
instances: state-sponsored media in China are becoming 
receptive to online communication (Hassid, 2012; Rauch-
fleisch & Schäfer, 2015; Tang & Sampson, 2012). Moreover, 
this agenda-setting effect of online communication on state-
sponsored media is also likely to serve as a stimulus amplifi-
cation that makes a response by political elites likelier (Jiang, 
2014). A similar reversal of agenda-setting flows has been 
observed in South Korea, although the amplification effect is 
a lot stronger, because the media system is less restricted 
than in China (Kim & Lee, 2007).
The potential impact of the Internet on the agenda-setting 
function is high. Online communication can, as argued 
above, coalesce into communication flows that either on 
their own or through amplification effects through mass 
media elicit responses from political elites.
Third Function: Control and Criticism
When the first and second functions achieve relative per-
manence, agenda-setting grows into another type of 
exchange that is best described as control and criticism. 
The political elites are still receptive to stimuli stemming 
from the public through agenda-setting. In addition, politi-
cal accountability changes the nature of this process insofar 
as the public, in turn, reacts to the actions undertaken by the 
political elites which results in further stimuli that the polit-
ical elites are, again, receptive to. In other words, a policy 
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cycle emerges (Lasswell, 1956). Functionally, a policy 
cycle can be described as a principal–agent-relationship 
(Calvert, McCubbins, & Weingast, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Miller, 2005). The principal (the citizens) is (implicitly or 
explicitly) giving the agent (the political elites) a mandate. 
The public sphere is the way the principal monitors and, if 
necessary, corrects the agent by giving stimuli feedback.
Why should political elites engage in such a policy cycle? 
We do not have to speculate about changes in the intrinsic 
motivation of political actors—there is no need to assume a 
sudden motivational transformation of political actors once 
the public sphere achieves higher levels with more perma-
nence. Instead, it is very likely that the specific institutional 
configurations within a country matter. In democracies, for-
mal political power is tied to popular sovereignty and as a 
consequence, political office is temporarily granted by popu-
lar elections. It is in the self-interest of political actors to be 
adequately responsive to public stimuli so as to increase the 
probability of retaining office.
Impact of the Internet. The logic of the control and criticism 
function is one of accountability. While the Internet cannot 
create the institutional preconditions necessary for a policy 
cycle based on accountability, it can expand and expedite 
existing processes. A prominent example for this is the imple-
mentation of so-called “e-government”: services that make 
access to governmental information easier, encourage inter-
action and promote transparency (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 
2012). E-government has been found to contribute to citizen 
trust in their government (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006) and 
has been linked to a reduction of perceived (Elbahnasawy, 
2014) and actual corruption (Krishnan, Teo, & Lim, 2013).
The potential impact of the Internet on the function of 
control and criticism is medium. The main reason is the insti-
tutional barrier necessary to allow for control and criticism. 
However, when the institutional configuration allows for a 
control and criticism policy cycle, the Internet can contribute 
to such a policy cycle by making observation by and feed-
back from the public simpler and more immediate.
Fourth Function: Deliberation
Deliberation is the fourth and final function of our model: 
when the prior functions are realized with some permanence, 
the public sphere is in such a good shape that instances of 
deliberation, that is, of rational disputes over validity claims 
(Habermas, 1976) seem to enter the realm of the possible.
Impact of the Internet. The potential contribution of the Inter-
net to deliberation is obvious: it represents an opportunity to 
engage in rational discussion over validity claims, because in 
principle, the Internet offers a communicative space that 
approaches an ideal speech situation (Buchstein, 1997; Heng 
& de Moor, 2003), that is, a discursive setting in which any-
one can question existing and introduce new claims.
The potential impact of the Internet on the deliberation 
function is low. The prerequisites of deliberation are just as 
difficult to fulfill online as they are offline (cf. Zamith & 
Lewis, 2014), and those demanding criteria of rational dis-
course are more likely to be met by professional communi-
cation in the mass media than by “layman” online 
communication which is often characterized by a semi-
private attitude toward the communication situation 
(Rasmussen, 2014).
The Impact of the Internet on the Generalized 
Functions of the Public Sphere as a Diminishing 
Marginal Utility
In the previous subsections, we have described the four gen-
eralized functions of the public sphere and the potential 
impact the Internet has on those functions. The potential 
impact of the Internet is not universal: it is medium for iden-
tity building, high for agenda-setting, medium for control 
and criticism, and low for deliberation. In essence, this 
means that we expect the potential impact of the Internet on 
the functions of the public sphere to be a diminishing mar-
ginal utility. The logic of the potential impact of the Internet 
as a diminishing marginal utility is visualized in Figure 1.
Translating the Model of Generalized 
Functions Into a Comparative Research 
Program
We have introduced the model of generalized functions of 
the public sphere in order to further the debate on the ques-
tion of whether the Internet contributes to the public sphere. 
We have specified different magnitudes of impact that the 
Internet is likely to have for each of the four functions of the 
public sphere. Now, it is necessary to translate the model of 
generalized functions into a comparative research program. 
The goal is to arrive at an empirical cross-country compari-
son that is theoretically informed by the model of general-
ized functions of the public sphere. More specifically, we 
want to address the following research question:
RQ. What is the hierarchically highest function on which 
the Internet potentially has an impact for different 
countries?
The Impact of the Internet on the Generalized 
Functions of the Public Sphere: Structural 
Preconditions
The model of generalized functions of the public sphere 
describes four functions of the public sphere. We have argued 
that the Internet potentially impacts those functions, and that 
this potential impact is of different magnitude for the differ-
ent functions. The model of generalized functions of the 
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public sphere describes four functions of the public sphere. 
We have argued that the Internet potentially impacts those 
functions, and that this potential impact is of different mag-
nitude for the different functions. In order to, in a next step, 
assess the highest function to which the Internet is likely to 
meaningfully contribute in a given country, it is necessary to 
first define some empirical criteria for doing so. We call 
these criteria the structural preconditions for the realization 
of the public sphere: the structural preconditions are macro-
level variables that encompass the main empirical dimen-
sions of the degree of realization of the functions of the 
public sphere. In other words, the structural preconditions 
are indicators that indicate, probabilistically, which level of 
the functions of the public sphere can be realized in a given 
country.
With the idea of Occam’s Razor in mind, it is necessary to 
select as few variables as possible that carry as much infor-
mation as possible as the structural preconditions. We pro-
pose three macro-level variables, and thus structural 
preconditions, that serve this purpose. First, since we are 
interested in finding out what the possible impact of the 
Internet on the functions of the public sphere is, an approxi-
mation for Internet usage has to be taken into account. 
Second, any country-level analysis of the public sphere is 
incomplete without taking into consideration mass media, 
because mass media still provide a master forum (Ferree, 
Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002b). Third, political institu-
tions matter. More specifically, the level of public communi-
cation is dependent on the level of civil liberties that are 
granted—public communication is, naturally, a function of 
the rights to communicate publicly.
For all of these three structural preconditions, suitable and 
carefully curated macro-level data exists. For an approxima-
tion of Internet availability, we use data on Internet penetra-
tion. We use data published by The World Bank (2014) that 
show the Internet penetration rate as the number of Internet 
users in a country per 100 people for the year 2012. The 
importance of the Internet penetration rate in the context of 
the Internet and public sphere has been recognized before 
(Kluver & Banerjee, 2005). It is a valid and reliable approxi-
mation for Internet usage.
For the structural precondition of mass media, different 
macro-level variables are possible. For example, one could 
focus on the absolute number of media outlets available in 
a country in order to approximate for media plurality. 
Alternatively, one could focus on the access to mass media, 
something akin to the access to the Internet. We choose a dif-
ferent and, we believe, more meaningful route by using data 
on media freedom as provided by the “Freedom of the Press” 
index published by Freedom House (2013) that covers the 
year 2012. The Freedom of the Press index ranges from 0 to 
100, where 0 means highest media freedom. Media freedom 
is a suitable macro-level indicator because it is an approxi-
mation for how likely the mass media can operate freely and 
independently from government and other restrictions. 
Usually, media freedom is a very normative concept, but in 
this context, it is simply the functional component of media 
freedom that is of interest: the freer mass media are, the 
closer they come to truly contributing to the higher functions 
of the public sphere. For example, the more the media are 
controlled and censored, the less likely they are to contribute 
to agenda-setting. Instead of relaying stimuli from the public 
to the political elites and provoke responses, state-controlled 
media relay stimuli from the government onto the public.
For the structural precondition of civil liberties, we rely 
on the civil liberties dimension of the Democracy Index that 
covers the year 2012 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2013). The civil liberties dimension of the Democracy Index 
ranges from 0 to 10, where 10 means full civil liberties. Civil 
liberties as measured by the Democracy Index encompasses 
Figure 1. Visualization of the diminishing marginal utility of the Internet for the functions of the public sphere.
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measures for the rule of law, freedom of religion, and respect 
of human rights and property. Crucially, it also covers free-
dom of expression, association, and protest. The civil liber-
ties dimension of the Democracy Index also touches upon 
Internet use.3 Overall, civil liberties are an approximation for 
the institutional status of the freedom of expression, in a 
direct and indirect sense. It directly covers whether citizens 
are formally allowed to voice their political opinions pub-
licly. Other indirect aspects of freedom of expression are also 
relevant, because they indicate what level of repercussions 
are to be expected for voicing one’s opinion publicly. For 
example, formal freedom of expression is not very meaning-
ful without rule of law, because political elites can curb and 
punish unwanted public communication at will. These vari-
ables, measuring so-called coordination goods, have also 
been identified as an important driver for democratization 
(de Mesquita & Downs, 2005).
Exploratory Data Analysis
In the previous section, we have described the three macro-
level variables which we use to compare countries in order 
to determine what the highest function of the public sphere 
to which the Internet contributes is in different countries. 
On a methodological level, the actual comparison could, in 
principle, be performed in a multitude of ways. Two factors 
are relevant for the choice of an appropriate method. First, 
we want to compare countries according to three macro-
level variables at once, and second, the available data cov-
ers 166 countries.4 We are thus faced with data of a 
complexity that, effectively, bars the use of qualitative, 
non-standardized analysis. For that reason, we perform the 
data analysis with the help of unsupervised learning algo-
rithms. More precisely, we decided to apply cluster analy-
sis, because cluster analysis is a well-established method in 
the social sciences for grouping observations into homoge-
neous classes.
There are different variants of cluster analysis. In order to 
determine the most suitable variant, we analyzed the distri-
bution of the different variables with the help of kernel den-
sity plots (Scott, 1992). The results of the kernel density 
estimations are reported in Figure 2.
For all three variables, groups of countries with differ-
ent Gaussian distributions can clearly be expected. This 
can be exemplified with civil liberties and its two peaks or 
with Internet penetration rate and the peak at an extremely 
low rate in the density plot. Based on the results of the 
kernel density estimations, we decided to implement a 
Gaussian mixture model (GMM) with expectation-maxi-
mization (EM) algorithm (Fraley & Raftery, 2002). This 
method can suitably cope with outliers and different densi-
ties in groups. Furthermore, the solution of the GMM that 
fits best to the data can be determined with the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978), which 
brings with it a number of advantages (Fraley & Raftery, 
1999). Additionally, GMM with EM states the uncertainty 
of the classification for every observation. This helps to 
overcome the problem of static theoretical typologies with 
cohesive categories and allows for a better interpretation 
of the results on a per-country basis. The uncertainty 
reports the likelihood of every single case for every cluster 
to actually belong to that cluster.
We used the Mclust Package in the R programming envi-
ronment (Fraley, Raftery, Murphy, & Scrucca, 2012). In 
order to decide which model fits best to the data, we com-
pared the BIC for all of the possible combinations (n = 789). 
A three component model with ellipsoidal varying distribu-
tion, volume, shape, and orientation was the best-fitting solu-
tion. Whether these country groups5 make sense in light of 
our model of generalized functions of the public sphere will 
be analyzed in the discussion. Table 2 shows a summary of 
the variables for each group. Figure 3 shows the classifica-
tion and covariance for the groups, and Figure 4 summarizes 
the three variables for each group as boxplots.
As mentioned above, the uncertainty for every country 
was calculated. Uncertainty is an estimate for a country’s 
likelihood to actually belong to the assigned group. A high 
uncertainty6 indicates that a country might belong to another 
group.
Figure 2. Kernel density plots for all three variables with a rug 
on the x-axis.
Color indicates density.
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Three Different Country Groups
The biggest differentiator between the first group and the 
other two groups is the first group’s very low Internet penetra-
tion rate (see Figure 5). Group 2 consists of countries with a 
flawed media freedom and low civil liberties, but these coun-
tries have a higher Internet penetration rate than the countries 
in Group 1 (see Figure 6). Still, they are well below the high 
levels of saturation for all three macro-level variables that can 
be observed for Group 3. Besides very high civil liberties 
with a low standard deviation, the media is free and the 
Internet penetration rate is high in the countries of Group 3. 
The countries with the highest uncertainty in Group 3 (Italy 
and Trinidad and Tobago) are those with the lowest Internet 
penetration rates and civil liberties (Figure 7). It should also 
be noted that Group 3 has the lowest total population. The 
total population of all countries in Group 3 is lower than the 
population of China or India as single countries.
Table 2. The Three Components of the Cluster Analysis With the Means and Standard Deviation (SD) in Brackets.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Freedom of the Press 59.39 (16.48) 56.96 (20.19) 19.64 (6.44)
Internet penetration rate 7.41 (5.24) 44.84 (17.19) 78.35 (11.14)
Civil liberties 4.98 (2.13) 5.88 (2.68) 9.35 (0.48)
Population total 2,717,960,740 3,384,197,687 1,010,015,434
Countries n 56 77 33
Figure 3. Overview with the classification.
The ellipses in the scatterplots visualize the covariances of the components. For example, in the upper right hand corner the scatterplot shows the 
Internet penetration rate on the x-axis and the Freedom of the Press on the y-axis. Symbol indicates group.
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Discussion
Three different groups of countries were identified in our 
empirical model. These groups can be understood in terms of 
the proposed theoretical model of generalized functions of 
the public sphere: for all groups, the Internet has the potential 
to contribute to the functions of the public sphere. However, 
the highest of the four functions to which the Internet can 
potentially contribute is different for each group.
Group 1 mainly represents countries where the Internet at 
most has the potential to contribute to identity building. All 
countries in this group have a very low Internet penetration, 
which means that online communication can only contribute 
to the function of identity building. For agenda-setting and, 
eventually, criticism and control as next steps, the Internet 
penetration rate has to be higher. Countries with relatively 
high Internet penetration rate in Group 1 show a high degree 
of uncertainty and are on the path to agenda-setting.
When more people have access to the Internet, as is the 
case in Group 2, it becomes more likely that the Internet con-
tributes to agenda-setting, because a critical mass of people 
can be reached and potentially mobilized, which means that 
the threshold of the political elites to perceive public com-
munication is more likely to be reached. The success of 
Figure 4. Tukey-boxplots for each variable and group.
Dashed line indicates standard deviation (SD), the square indicates M.
Figure 5. Section of the scatterplot with the countries of Group 1 with the two variables civil liberties and Internet penetration rate.
Color visualizes uncertainty.
10 Social Media + Society
agenda-setting is also heavily influenced by civil liberties 
and media freedom. The higher the civil liberties, the more 
likely it is that people will openly speak out. Also, the higher 
the media freedom, the more likely it is that critical issues 
will be picked up and amplified by the media. This aspect 
has already been highlighted in studies in the South Korean 
(Kim & Lee, 2007) and Chinese (Jiang, 2014) context, future 
research, thus, should focus more on cross-country compari-
sons. China and South Korea both belong to Group 2, but 
they have different preconditions which heavily influence 
the probability of successful agenda-setting.
For criticism and control to be realized, more civil liber-
ties are needed, as can be found in Group 3. Only in coun-
tries with a high degree of civil liberties can the political 
system be openly criticized without fear of severe punish-
ment. Due to the high Internet penetration rate, a great 
majority of people affected by an issue of common concern 
can participate in public online communication. However, 
given that the other structural prerequisites, civil liberties 
and media freedom, are so highly developed in Group 3, the 
Internet can be expected to contribute relatively little to the 
already highly realized functions of the public sphere. The 
Figure 6. Section of the scatterplot with the countries of Group 2 with the two variables civil liberties and Internet penetration rate.
Color visualizes uncertainty.
Figure 7. Section of the scatterplot with the countries of Group 3 with the two variables civil liberties and Internet penetration rate.
Color visualizes uncertainty.
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interplay of all three variables on a high level enables con-
trol and criticism.
Besides these general results, some countries in our anal-
ysis are of special interest because of their current position. 
All countries with a high uncertainty in our model (e.g. 
Mongolia and Indonesia in Group 1, Bulgaria and Portugal 
in Group 2, Italy and Trinidad and Tobago in Group 3) are 
interesting cases, because they have the greatest potential to 
move up or down one step.
Furthermore, with Bahrain, United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
Kuwait, and Qatar, an interesting sub-group can be observed 
in Group 2. These countries share one common characteris-
tic: their economies heavily rely on oil revenues, which pos-
sibly hinders democratic development (Ross, 2001) and 
strengthens authoritarian rule. With fast growing Internet 
penetration rates in countries such as Iran and Russia, this 
sub-group within Group 2 that is dependent on natural 
resources might in the future become more saturated and will 
develop into a separate group. These future developments 
might also affect our theoretical reasoning. Future research 
should closely observe these countries. Without a change in 
civil liberties, the Internet will not contribute to higher func-
tions of the public sphere. This sub-group of countries exem-
plifies that there is not a predetermined development toward 
more civil liberties and media freedom. Internet penetration 
is the only macro variable which is constantly increasing, but 
a direct impact on political institutions is unlikely.
Deliberation: The Grand Thing That Never Was?
Empirically, we have identified three groups of countries. 
For each of those groups, we argue that the Internet poten-
tially contributes to the functions of the public sphere, but the 
highest function to which the Internet potentially contributes 
is different for each group. The empirical results do not, 
however, perfectly correspond to the model of generalized 
functions of the public sphere: there is no separate fourth 
group where the Internet could contribute to the function of 
deliberation. This lack of a fourth group could prompt three 
responses. First, deliberation could be removed from the 
generalized functions of the public sphere. Second, the data 
analysis could be redone in such a way that it results in four 
instead of three country groups. Third, the nature of delibera-
tion and its relevance as a generalized function of the public 
sphere could be reassessed. We are convinced that only the 
third option is a reasonable one. Neither an ad hoc alteration 
of the model of generalized functions nor the massaging of 
data so as to produce some desired results are scientifically 
sound options.
We are not of the opinion that deliberation is obsolete or 
non-existent. However, deliberation is first and foremost a 
micro-level concept that stems from pragmatics, or, more 
precisely, from speech-act theory (Habermas, 1976). This 
makes empirical research on deliberation a very demanding 
enterprise that yields modest results at best, not least when 
it comes to micro-level research (Neblo, 2007). It is 
hardly surprising, then, that macro-level variables do not 
identify countries where the Internet can contribute to 
deliberation.
There is no reason to remove deliberation from the model 
of generalized functions of the public sphere. We use the 
model of generalized functions as the theoretical foundation 
of a macro-level cross-country comparison centered on the 
question of the impact of the Internet. For this empirical 
research program, the function of deliberation is of little 
importance. Of course, that does not mean that the function 
of deliberation in the model of generalized functions cannot 
become more relevant in other empirical contexts, such as 
case-studies or micro-level research. However, we do think 
that a debate on the real-world relevance of deliberation 
should take place. Deliberation currently enjoys great promi-
nence in public sphere research, as is indicated in Figure 8, 
and a myopic focus on deliberation means that the other 
functions of the public sphere receive too little attention.
Of course, we are not the first ones to notice that delibera-
tion in a narrow, micro-level sense is a tough conceptual nut 
to crack. That is precisely the reason why a number of theo-
retical advancements propose to think of deliberation not as 
a narrow, micro-level concept that also has macro-level 
implications, but instead as a genuine macro-level concept in 
its own right. One of the more promising strands of thought 
in this context is the idea of deliberation as deliberative sys-
tems (Mansbridge et al., 2012), where the locus of research 
lies on the systemic level, not on individual acts of commu-
nication. Deliberation as deliberative systems offers the tan-
talizing prospect of making deliberation observable and 
understandable on the macro- and meso-levels without the 
need for individual micro-level acts of deliberation to actu-
ally take place. Promising though this novel line of reasoning 
is, we believe that further research is needed to clarify 
whether deliberation as deliberative systems, if it is fully 
severed from its conceptual micro-level roots, means not 
only “deliberation on a different scale,” but also “delibera-
tion in a different sense.”
The Transformative Potential of the Internet
Theoretically, we have described the contribution of the 
Internet to the functions of the public sphere as a diminishing 
marginal utility. The greatest impact of the Internet, we have 
argued, is to be expected for the function of agenda-setting.
Empirically, we have identified three groups of countries 
and interpreted these groups in terms of the highest func-
tions of the public sphere to which the Internet can poten-
tially contribute. The most relevant of those groups is the 
second one, where the Internet penetration rate is high 
enough for significant parts of the populations to have 
access to online communication, but civil liberties and 
media freedom are not as well developed as, for example, in 
Western democracies.
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The theoretical impact of the Internet as a diminishing 
marginal utility explains what the transformative potential of 
the Internet for the public sphere is. Our empirical analysis 
identifies where this transformative potential is most likely 
to occur. The theoretical expectations and the empirical find-
ings lead us to the following conclusion: the transformative 
potential of the Internet lies in its potential contribution to 
the function of agenda-setting for the countries belonging to 
the second group.
Outlook
Based on the results and arguments put forward in this arti-
cle, future research can be contextualized and case-study 
research can plausibly articulate expectations regarding the 
impact of the Internet on the functions of the public sphere. 
The reasons for this are twofold.
First, structural configurations influence how likely 
actions are. This is the core logic of the generalized functions 
of the public sphere. If, for example, a given country has low 
civil liberties, media freedom, and Internet penetration, it is 
not at all impossible that some sort of control and criticism 
cycle will occasionally happen. It is, however, unlikely that 
the control and criticism cycle will happen often enough to 
achieve permanence. This means that the relationship 
between structures and actions in our model of the general-
ized functions of the public sphere is not one of determinism: 
we do not believe that structural configurations represent 
either an a posteriori smoking gun to completely explain or 
an a priori tool to exactly predict singular events. Instead, 
the structural configurations indicate likelihoods.
Second, structures tend to be path dependent. This means 
that the empirical strategy from this article is suited to be 
turned into a longitudinal project. By repeating the macro-
level measurements we did in this article over time, it will 
become visible what countries are on which trajectory in 
terms of functions of the public sphere. This means that it 
might become visible when a country is on a path toward 
reaching higher levels of the public sphere functions, and, 
thus, in which countries the transformative potentials of the 
Internet are likely to be realized.
For both of these reasons, the understanding of the poten-
tial impact of the Internet on the functions of the public 
sphere as proposed in this article merits scientific attention.
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Notes
1. Dewey is talking about the state, but he is applying the same 
functionalist logic in the analysis of the public sphere.
Figure 8. Comparison between the keywords Public Sphere and Deliberation/Deliberative on Google Scholar.
The x-axis begins in 1989, the year in which Jürgen Habermas’ (1989) “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere” was translated into English.
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2. We use the German Vergemeinschaftung because there is not 
a precise enough corresponding English expression; one could 
possibly opt to use the French detour “communitarization.”
3. One of the 17 criteria measures whether there are political 
restrictions on access to the Internet.
4. All countries that are covered by all three macro-level vari-
ables were included in the analysis.
5. We refer to the clusters as groups.
6. The uncertainty can be calculated by subtracting the probabil-
ity of the most likely group for each observation from 1.
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